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1. The Power of Legality in the Context of Custom Making 
 
The editors of this book have invited scholars to contribute, with arguments and 
examples, in aiding to demonstrate how legality is built at the international level. 
According to their proposition, legality has the potency to bridge the artificial 
dichotomies between politics and law, legal idealism and political realism, or 
normativity and empiricity. Rather than deriving from legal formalism, the power of 
legality stems from the practice of all involved actors (including international courts 
and their judges that are central to the present paper) and how this is shaped from 
“their shared assumptions, doctrines and values about the law”. Thus, legality derives 
from and ultimately amounts to international practice, which may be “understood as 
competent performances that order our social world through creating symbols and 
giving meaning to actions”. The association of legality with international practice 
explains why the former is constantly re-produced. Communities of actors, including 
institutions, such as international courts and tribunals, incessantly develop practices.  
 
This is an appealing intellectual scheme that could also be understood as a theory. Be 
it truthful, such a theory would contradict one other argument the editors make when 
they criticise the Cartesian duality distinguishing between theory and reality that 
validates, or invalidates a theory on the basis of its effectiveness in the real world. 
However, rather than a theory, that motivating approach may be perceived as an “anti-
theory” and a hypothesis at the same time. As an “anti-theory”, it calls scholars to 
abstain from founding their analysis on a priori theories, that is, on pre-established 
knowledge and old academic schemes that reflect practices of the past, some of which 
may have been abandoned, whereas others may still survive the test of time. Likewise 
the evolution of social practices cannot leave legality or theories about legality 
Rajkovic, Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds.), Power of Legality: Practices of 
International Law and their Politics, CUP, 2016. 
	 2	
unaffected. Besides, this is why legality is perpetually re-produced through practices. 
As a hypothesis, this approach invites scholars (as practicing actors) to employ a 
methodology that conceptualises what the editors call a “bottom up” course. This 
consists of studying “concepts and categories […] as they are produced by the 
relevant actors in/of the field.” The study of these practices leads to an interpretation 
as to how these practicing actors (and especially the ones having the authority to do 
so) “perceive and construe”, and thereby construct, legality –also through 
“recognition and validation”. The task of that approach is to place the accent on the 
actors whose conduct constitutes practice, which then translates into legality spanning 
the worlds of politics and law, of facts and norms, of “is” and “ought”.  
 
This type of duality is also present in what constitutes the object of this paper. For, 
international custom is together reality and law, fact and norm. Dualism is inherent to 
its être and goes well beyond its famous two elements, namely the objective 
component, which corresponds to practice, and the subjective one of opinio juris that 
reflects the existence of general acceptance of and shared convictions about the 
normative force of said practice. Custom is practice and opinio juris in the same 
breath, but also is and ought,1 regularity and regulation (rule),2 social process and 
legal output.3 Transition from practice to law has always been – and will always 
remain – a mystery to lawyers.4 This is why custom has been given the rather 
“agnostic” label of a spontaneous5 phenomenon – yet this term merely implies that 
																																																								
1 C. Tomuschat, “International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century”, 
RCADI, vol. 281, 2001, p. 331. 
2 J. Combacau, “Ouverture: de la régularité à la règle», Droits: Revue Française de Théorie Juridique” 
vol. 3, 1986, pp. 3-10. 
3 P. M. Dupuy, “L’unité de l’ordre juridique international”, RCADI, vol. 297, 2003, p. 159. 
4 P. Weil, “Le droit international en quête de son identité”, RCADI, vol. 237, 1996, p. 161. See that 
same idea in Abi-Saab who characterises custom as a “processus mystérieux et une des énigmes 
permanentes du droit international”. G. Abi-Saab, “Cours général de droit international public”, 
RCADI, vol. 207, 1996, p. 174-175.   
5 Among other publications by R. Ago, “Science juridique et droit international”, RCADI, vol. 90, 
1957, pp. 851 et seq. and especially p. 932 et seq., and  “Droit positif et droit international”, AFDI, vol. 
3, 1957, pp. 55-56. This same idea seems to be accepted by one of the most eminent voluntarist 
positivists too. As above at 4, Weil, “Le droit international”, p. 179. 
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lawyers 6  miss the necessary tools to apprehend, study, and conceptualise the 
transformation of social reality into a posited rule having the power of law. In spite of 
ignorance about the “inner” mechanisms of custom, why and how it becomes law, it 
may be presumed that its twofold strands operate in a circular fashion of constant 
interaction.7 Custom is a legal obligation because it is practiced in society; likewise, it 
is social reality because the members of the society conceive it, and implement it as 
law. As such, custom remains to be unceasingly re-confirmed and re-constructed.8       
 
Still, to this day, there exist more questions about custom than answers. Our lack of 
knowledge extends beyond the psychological (highly subjective) element. That a 
practice is empirically observable means nothing without definitions, rules and 
delimitations regarding the types of social conduct accounting for customary practice. 
Hence, scholarly understanding of custom is varied, expanding from the 
announcement of its death9 to its “resurrection” as a new custom that primarily relies 
																																																								
6 Other disciplines within social science may have more pertinent tools in that respect. See for instance 
J.-L. Goldsmith and E.-A. Posner, “A Theory of Customary International Law”, The University of 
Chicago Law Review, vol. 66, 1999, pp. 1113-1177. Cf. A. Guzman and T. Meyer, “Customary 
International Law in the 21st Century”, in R.-A. Miller, R.-M. Bratspies (eds.), Progress in 
International Law (Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008) pp. 197-217, M.-A. Chinen, “Game Theory and Customary 
International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner”, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, vol. 23, 2001, pp. 143-189, and G. Norman and J.-P. Trachtman, “The Customary 
International Law Game”, AJIL, vol. 99, 2005, pp. 541-580. Contra, D.-F. Vagts, “International 
Relations Looks at Customary International Law: A Traditionalist’s Defence”, EJIL, vol. 15, 2004, pp. 
1031-1040.        
7 On the idea of circularity, see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of the 
International Legal Argument, reissue, CUP, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 410 et seq., and M. Byers, Custom, 
Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law, CUP, 
Cambridge, 1999, p. 136. See also the comments by Kolb (as well as his references to Bobbio) who 
emphasises the dynamic/evolutive nature of circularity. R. Kolb, “Selected Problems in the Theory of 
Customary International Law”, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 50, 2003, pp. 137 et seq.  
8 M.-H. Mendelson, “The Formation of Customary International Law”, RCADI, vol. 272, 1999, p. 175.  
9 P.-J. Kelly, “The Twilight of Customary International Law”, VJIL, vol. 40, 2000, pp. 449-543.  
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upon opinio juris.10 It is not within the scope of this paper to address any of these 
questions. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, the accent is moved away 
from what is seen as the archetype of international customary practice, namely state 
practice. Instead, emphasis is given to another actor, whose practice customary theory 
often reproduces, albeit in a rather uncritical manner. This paper discusses the role 
and the significance of one particular facet of that practice, which the editors of this 
volume refer to as interpretive communities, namely international courts and their 
judges. In that respect, this paper suggests two arguments.   
 
First, scholarship has extensively debated the methods11 international courts shall 
apply to identify the existence of international custom, which they then interpret with 
the view to give customary rules effect within the context of a dispute or a legal 
question. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that, while identifying 
custom, courts and judges (re-)define custom as a source of international law. Thus, 
through custom identification, courts hold the master key to the definition of custom. 
Second, de facto, judges and courts have the authority to act as a substitute to the 
absence of formalism in custom making. By recognising the validity of customary 
rules they catalytically contribute to the customary process. These two arguments are 																																																								
10  Among others, B.-D. Lepard, Customary International Law. A New Threory with Practical 
Applications, CUP, Cambridge, 2010, and mainly A.-E. Roberts, “Traditional and Modern Approaches 
to Customary International Law: a Reconcilation”, AJIL, vol. 95, 2001, pp. 757 et seq.. Roberts 
defends the idea of a new custom of deductive nature mainly founded on opinio juris and declarations. 
That same idea (especially in respect to human rights protection) can be found in other authors as well, 
such as T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989, pp. 94 et seq., and J.-F. Flauss, “La protection des droits de l’homme et les sources du 
droit international: Rapport general”, La protection des droits de l’homme et l’évolution du droit 
international, SFDI, Pedone, Paris, 1998, p. 65. According to Wouters and Ryngaert, this “new 
custom” in the area of human rights “may in due course have an impact on general international law 
[… as] the traditional requirements of consistency of state practice may be played down a bit, provided 
that a strong opinio juris, democratically informed by global state consent, has crystallized in 
international fora”. J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert, “Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary 
International Law”, in M.-T. Kamminga and Scheinin M. Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights 
Law on General International Law, OUP, Oxford, 2009, p. 131.  
11 For the ICJ, it is necessary that the “presence” of  “customary rules […] in the opinio juris of States 
can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, 
and not by deduction from preconceived ideas.” ICJ, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the 
Gulf of Maine Area, Canada/United States of America, 12-10-1984, par. 111. Cf. the authors mentioned 
in the previous footnote. See also the critical remarks by Weil, as above at 4, “Le droit international”, 
p. 172, as well as in more recent bibliography, W.T. Worster, “The Inductive and Deductive Methods 
in Customary International Law Analysis: Traditional and Modern Approaches”, Georgetown Journal 
of International Law, vol. 45, 2014, pp. 445-521, and S. Talmon, Determining Customary International 
Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, Bonn Research Papers on 
International Law, Paper No 4/2014, available online at [http://www.jura.uni-
bonn.de/index.php?id=1004]. 
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developed in paragraphs 2 and 3 respectively of the paper. Paragraph 4 concludes and 
links the paper’s analysis to the framework suggested by the book’s editors in their 
introductive note.   
 
 
2. Custom as a matrix, and the role of judges and courts  
 
Custom consists of an inherent duality split between the rule, namely, the normative 
output of the customary process and, secondly, the process itself, which corresponds 
to one of the two primary sources of international law.12 Obviously, this is yet another 
dyad characterising that concept. What is less obvious though is that courts occupy a 
privileged place in that process that allows them to interpret and, thereby, (re-)define 
the latter dimension of custom – that is, custom as a source, corresponding to what the 
title of this paper calls a “matrix”.  
 
In simpler terms, the definition of custom (and its qualification) as a source of 
international law is a norm/rule13 (the two terms being used interchangeably in the 
paper) of international law. The rather laconic text of Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ 
Statute,14 which defines custom as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”, is 
a prime example of such a norm.15 As with all rules, in order for the named Article to 
acquire concrete content, it needs to be applied in context. Interpretation is required 
to answer what general practice is and when this is accepted as law. In a nutshell, 
courts interpret not only customary rules, but their matrix too – both of which are 
rules. Although interpretation rarely distinguishes between these two separate aspects 
of judicial reasoning the criteria courts set to identify custom are elements of its 
definition as a matrix/source of international law. For, defining custom is implicit in 
																																																								
12 H. Kelsen, “Théorie du droit international coutumier”, in C. Leben (ed.), Hans Kelsen: écrits 
français de droit international, PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 71.   
13 Corresponding to a systemic “meta-rule” founding other rules within the legal order or to a rule of 
recognition in Hartian terms. H.-L.-A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edition, Clarendon Law Series, 
OUP, 2012, p. 256 (postscript). 
14 On the codification of Article 38, see D.-J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law, CUP, New York, 
2010, pp. 142 et seq.  
15 See also the interesting approach by Barberis who argues that the two elements of custom are not part 
of the customary process, but merely a technique that allows recognising its existence. J. Barberis, “La 
coutume est-elle une source de droit international?” Le droit international au service de la paix de la 
justice et du développement. Mélanges Michel Virally, Pedone, Paris, 1991, p. 51. 
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the process of custom identification, that is, judicial investigation regarding the 
transformation of social conduct into law and its content. Interpretation is central to 
that process. This explains why, to define custom, textbooks of international law and 
scholars more generally resort to relevant case law, which, according to Article 
38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute is a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law”.  
 
However, interpretation is by definition subjective; it depends on the theoretical (but 
also the highly ideological, as will be claimed below) premises of courts and the 
prevailing judicial majorities within them. Hence, an absence of a single definition of 
custom should not be surprising. One may wonder if, beyond the minimalistic 
conception of the two customary elements (which, as it will be shown, is challenged 
by courts), there is one single definition of custom as a source or a variety of 
perceptions of it. The following examples, which, for reasons of consistency and – 
given the limited scope of the paper – brevity, are in principle taken from the practice 
of the ICJ, are quite illustrative of the existence of diverse perceptions of custom.     
 
2.1. What is custom after all?  
 
Opinio juris is obscure in that it is difficult to be empirically observed and 
evidenced.16 However, the ICJ makes it clear that the maxim does not imply an 
agreement between two states that mutually recognise the existence of a customary 
rule. Therefore, it is not such an agreement that turns customary practice into a rule of 
law,17 but the shared belief18 (conviction in the French version of the judgment19) of 
states that a certain practice produces legal effects. Thus,  
 																																																								
16 Thus, according to Haggenmacher, opinio juris “est essentiellement le fait de l’interprète”. P. 
Haggenmacher, “La doctrine des deux éléments du droit coutumier dans la pratique de la Cour 
internationale”, RGDIP, vol. 90, 1986, p. 117. 
17 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, 27-06-1986, para. 184. See also, among others, A.-A. Cançado Trindade, “International Law 
for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium (I): General Course on Public International Law”, 
RCADI, vol. 316, 2005, pp. 175-176.  
18 See also, as above at 6, Guzman and Meyer, “Customary International Law in the 21st Century”, p. 
206. According to the authors, under a functional analysis, the opinio juris requirement can be 
understood as referring to the beliefs of others states as to the legal obligations binding a given state.  
19 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, Federal Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands and Denmark, 
20-02-1969, para. 77. 
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“[t]he need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, 
is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The 
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character 
of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, 
e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed 
almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of 
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal 
duty.”20 [emphasis added]   
 
Practice, on the other hand, is empirically observable. Nevertheless, this does not 
make it easier to define what customary practice is. In its rather old judgment on the 
Right to Passage over Indian Territory, the ICJ recognised the existence of local 
custom because the practice at issue was “constant and uniform”21, and extended 
“over a period […] beyond a century and a quarter”22. A few years later, the same 
Court presided over the seminal for the definition of custom North Sea Continental 
Shelf case, where it held that a conventional rule may become custom even in the 
absence of the requirements of long and uniform practice. The Court explained in that 
respect that   
 
“even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very 
widespread and representative participation in the convention might 
suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were 
specially affected.”23 [emphasis added] 
 
Furthermore, practice does not have to be absolutely consistent. As it has been 
explained by the same Court, 
  
“[i]t is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of 
the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States 
should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force 																																																								
20 Ibid. 
21 ICJ, Right to Passage over Indian Territory, Portugal v. India, 12-04-1960, p. 40. 
22 Ibid. 
23 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, as above at 19, para. 73. 
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or from intervention in each other’s interna1 affairs. The Court does not 
consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with 
the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court 
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as 
breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new 
rule.”24 [emphasis added] 
     
2.2. The role of ideology in custom making  
 
One may see in these passages a fragmentation of law, consisting in the present 
instance of inconsistencies surrounding a “systemic” rule of the international legal 
order that defines how rules of general international law are created. Instead of 
fragmentation, another perspective would deem the term of evolution more 
appropriate when tracing the definition of custom by the ICJ. One could, finally, 
envisage a more moderate approach highlighting the difference in the context25 of 
each particular case that invited the Court to elaborate on the applicable criteria for 
the recognition of the existence of customary rules. Nevertheless, the terms one may 
choose to characterise the case law at issue are of little importance for this paper. 
Arguably, the lack of consistency and clarity regarding the definition of custom does 
not favour legal certainty – which, especially in the case of an informal source such as 
custom that establishes non-written rules, which, ipso facto, fail to satisfy the 
exigencies of legal certainty, is of essence. However, what truly matters for the 
purposes of this paper, and what the examples given above strive to aid in 
demonstrating is how courts and judges define the matrix of custom. That is, how, 
through the means of interpretation for the purposes of law identification, courts 
define/set/interpret the conditions for custom to deliver normative outputs.  
 																																																								
24 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities, as above at 17, para. 186. Cf., regarding the transformation 
of conventional law into customary, ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, as above at 19, para. 74. 
25 On the importance of context for the identification of custom see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State, Germany v. Italy, Greece intervening, 03-02-2012, par. 55, where the Court explains that 
“[i]n the present context, State practice of particular significance is to be found in the judgments of 
national courts […]” [emphasis added].  
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Acknowledging the power courts have to shape the matrix of custom invites us to also 
accept that, as this is achieved by means of interpretation, and because interpretation 
is inherently subjective, that matrix is exposed to and may even be consequently 
dependent on the ideological preferences of the “key holders” i.e. courts and their 
judges. What distinguishes a judge from a scholar, or any other actor involved in the 
interpretation of a rule, is that the former is given the authority26 to turn her/his 
subjective interpretation into a legally binding judicial decision – which is principally 
compulsory for the parties to a dispute, but also develops a broader interpretative 
effect27 as an auxiliary tool for the determination of international law.28 Unlike 
scholars, judges and courts are bestowed with a “stamp” signifying their 
power/competence/authority to deliver justice based on rules accepted as valid within 
a given legal system and its constitutive society. However, just like scholars, judges 
also interpret those rules (and the rules used to found other rules, that is, the rules on 
the sources of the law) on the basis of their subjective preferences and understanding 
of the law, its scope and material sources (i.e. the extra-legal rationale behind a rule). 
Be they impartial, judges still see law and the facts behind it from their own, 
subjective perspective. They do not adjudicate in a vacuum; they carry to the bench 
their personal system of values and ideology, their personal understanding of what 
law is or ought to be, and they evaluate and assess the law the way they perceive it 
through the lens of their personal experience in life. Hence, the power of judges to 
impact on the definition of custom is of particular importance when it reveals certain 
ideological preferences.  
 
In Lotus, for instance, the ICJ’s predecessor, the PCIJ, clearly linked custom to the 
will of states. In terms of that famous passage, 																																																								
26 H.-L.-A. Hart, The Concept of Law, as above at 13, p. 45 (on custom). According to Hart’s social 
pragmatism, the validity of law owes to the practice of law-applying authorities, pp. 57-61. See also J. 
d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law. A Theory of the Ascertainment of 
Legal Rules, OUP, Oxford, 2011, pp. 203 et seq.. On public authority in international law, see the very 
systematic work of A. von Bogdandy, P. Dann, M. Goldmann, “Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities”, in A. von 
Bogdandy, R. Wolfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. Dann, M. Goldmann (eds.), The Exercise of Public 
Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer, 2010) p. 5 
and pp. 11 et seq.. On judicial authority, see A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “On the Functions of 
International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 2013, vol. 26, pp. 54 et seq..  
27 Among others, V.-D. Degan, “Two Modes of Generating Customary Rules of General International 
Law”, Jugoslovenska revija za medunarodno pravo, 1988, pp. 17-18.  
28 Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. 
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“[i]nternational law governs relations between independent States. The 
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free 
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a 
view to the achievement of common aims.”29 [emphasis added] 
  
As has been already explained, the “contractual” explanation of international 
customary law has been rejected by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, whereby the 
Court refused to establish custom on the basis of the consensus between the parties to 
the dispute that happened to mutually recognise its existence.30 The Court looked 
beyond that sort of bilateral recognition of the validity of the rule at issue and 
investigated the existence of a common belief among states. Nevertheless, in 1950, 
that same Court had defended the contractual premises of custom – admittedly by the 
means of an obiter dictum, in a case regarding regional custom, and in the context of a 
rather controversial doctrine, namely the persistent objection theory.31 In that respect, 
the ICJ noted in the Asylum case that it could not  
 
“[…] find that the Colombian Government has proved the existence of 
such a custom. But even if it could be supposed that such a custom 
existed between certain Latin-American States only, it could not be 
invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to 
it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it [...]”32. 
  
Although there remains the possibility that custom appears to primarily depend on the 
sovereign will of states within these cases, in another, relatively recent and equally 
famous dictum, the ICJ suggested a different justification as to the normative 																																																								
29 CPIJ, Lotus, (France v. Turkey), 07-09-1927, Series A, No 10, p. 18 and 19  
30 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities, as above at 17,  para. 184.  
31 Among others, P. Dumberry, “Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent Objector 
Revisited”, ICLQ, vol. 59, 2010, pp. 779-802. See also M. Koskenniemi, “The Normative Force of 
Habit: International Custom and Social Theory”, in M. Koskenniemi (éd.), The International Library of 
Essays in Legal Theory, (Areas 5, Aldershot, Dartmouth - Hong Kong, 1992) pp. 259-260.  
32 ICJ, Asylum, Colombia v. Peru, 20-11-1950, pp.  277-278. See also CIJ, Fisheries, United Kingdom 
v. Norway, 18-12-1951, p. 131. Cf. ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, as above at 19, para. 63.  
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foundation of custom. Of course, the context is of essence. At stake in that instance 
were rules destined to protect the human person. Thus, according to the Court, the 
ideal of the protection of humanity justifies disregarding state will.  
 
“With regard to international humanitarian law, the Court recalls that in 
its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, it stated that “a great many rules of humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflicts are so fundamental to the respect of the 
human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ [... that are 
to be] observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible 
principles of international customary law”33. [emphasis added] 
   
In similar terms, just to provide a (very selective) example outside the ICJ framework, 
the ICTY has equally linked custom with the protection of humanity, irrespective of 
state practice. Thus,  
 
“[a]dmittedly, there does not seem to have emerged recently a body of 
State practice consistently supporting the proposition that one of the 
elements of custom, namely usus or diuturnitas has taken shape. This is 
however an area where opinio juris sive necessitatis may play a much 
greater role than usus, as a result of the [...] Martens Clause. In the light 
of the way States and courts have implemented it, this Clause clearly 
shows that principles of international humanitarian law may emerge 
through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of 
humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice 
is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the form of opinio 
necessitatis, crystallizing as a result of the imperatives of humanity or 
public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the 
emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law”34. 
[emphasis added] 																																																								
33 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 09-07-2004, para. 157.  
34 ICTY, IT-95-16-T, Kupreškić et al., Trial Chamber Judgment, 14-01-2000, para. 527. 
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In the two sets of juxtaposed passages it is not difficult to identify, apart from the 
differences in the definition of custom by the respective Courts, the diametrically 
opposite theoretical premises that underpin these definitions. These foundations 
correspond in fact to two different theoretical (but also highly ideological) 
conceptions of international law. The first understands international law as solely 
emanating from state volonté.35 Namely, that the normative power of the law stems 
from the sovereign will of states. Consequently, customary law is perceived as the 
product of that sovereign will. Thus, the voluntarist/étatiste view of international law 
regards custom as a tacit agreement.36 Thereby, it emphasises state sovereignty and 
promulgates the notion that no rule can validly exist without the consent, or against 
the will of the sovereign state. It is working from within this mindset that the Lotus 
presumption acquires its full meaning. Because international law is not binding upon 
states unless they agree to it, everything not prohibited is deemed to be allowed. The 
second school of thought squarely rejects state will as the foundation of the normative 
power of international law – whereas in its more extreme expressions it rejects the 
idea of state sovereignty altogether. 37  The sociological objectivist reading of 
international law accepts that obligations reflecting the needs of the society be 
imposed without, or even against, the will of states.38 Ultimately, it is social necessity, 
and not the voluntas of sovereigns, that gives international law its legal force.39 																																																								
35 The literature on voluntarism, and its most eminent representatives, such as Jellinek, Triepel and 
Anzilotti, is vast. For a brief, but comprehensive overview, see P. Daillier, M. Forteau, A. Pellet, Droit 
international public, 8th edition, (LGDJ, Paris, 2009) pp. 90 and 110-113 et seq.. On the Anzilottian 
perception of voluntarism relying on the individual will of each sovereign state and the “constitutional 
principle” of pacta sunt servanda see D. Anzilotti, Cours de droit international, réédition, (LGDJ, 
Paris, 1999) especially pp.44 et seq.. 
36 G.-I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1974) p. 133, and 
by the same author, “Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law”, 
California Law Review, vol. 49, 1961, pp. 422-423; G.-M. Danilenko, “The Theory of International 
Customary Law”, GYIL, vol. 31, 1988, pp. 9 et seq..; but also, as above at 35, Anzilotti, Cours de droit 
international, pp. 73-79.  
37 Scelle for instance refused to see states as subjects of international law. G. Scelle, Cours de droit 
international public, (Domat Montchréstien, Paris, 1948) p. 23. On state sovereignty, as previously, 
Scelle, Cours de droit international public, pp. 99 et seq..                   
38 Here again, the literature on sociological objectivism and its main representatives, such as Duguit 
and Scelle is considerable. For an equally concise introduction, as above at 35, see P. Daillier et al. 
Droit international public, pp. 91 and 116-118. On the links between social necessity, on the one hand, 
and morality, and power, on the other, see G. Scelle, Cours de droit international public, Les cours de 
Droit, Paris, 1947-1948, pp. 11 et seq., and especially pp. 36-38. Especially regarding the power of 
custom to be imposed against state will, and its “dependence” on the judicial function, G. Scelle, Précis 
de droit des gens (Principes et systématiques), vol. II, Sirey, Paris, 1934, p. 298. 
39 N. Politis, “Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté et la théorie de l’abus des droits dans les 
rapports internationaux», RCADI, vol. 6, 1926, p. 9. 
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Custom is seen as a spontaneous40 translation within the society of the “imperative 
objective law”,41 which in the sociological objectivist theory is distinguished from 
formally posited law, and seen as coinciding with the material sources of the law that 
reflect the needs of the society. 42  Besides, as the complete (but also highly 
controversial) version of the maxim opinio juris sive necessitatis43 reveals, necessity 
is associated with the psychological element of custom.44   
 
The critical evaluation of these two theoretical approaches escapes the limited scope 
of this paper. Suffice it to remind that the struggle between apologetic, on the one 
hand, and utopian, on the other, approaches to international law is ongoing – being in 
a sense inherent to that legal system.45 More modern theories, such as that of the 
humanisation of international law,46 divide scholars (as well as all other interpretive 
actors) with those who prioritise state sovereignty opposing the ones who see it 
awakened because of the pre-eminence of rules perceived as necessary for the 
protection of values and interests that are seen as common to the entire international 
society (extending beyond the society of states) in areas such as the protection of 
human beings, their natural environment or their cultural heritage. 
 
Thus, international law vacillates between these two theoretical, but equally 
ideological extremes. These can effortlessly be discerned behind the examples 
regarding the definition of custom given earlier in the paper. Interestingly, in the 
hands of courts and judges – who have the power to identify custom, and thereby, as 																																																								
40 As above at 38, Scelle, Cours de droit, Les cours de Droit, Paris, pp. 10-11.  
41 As above at 38, Scelle, Précis de droit p. 51. Cf. the critique by S. Seferiades, “Aperçus sur la 
coutume juridique internationale et notamment sur son fondement”, RGDIP, vol. 43, 1936, pp. 155 et 
seq. and pp. 182 et seq..  
42 As above at 38, Scelle, Précis de droit pp. 5-6, and above at 37, Scelle, Cours de droit p. 571 (and, 
especially regarding custom, pp. 574, and 577). 
43 P. Guggenheim, “L’origine de la notion de l’“opinio juris sive necessitatis” comme deuxième 
élément de la coutume dans l’histoire du droit des gens”, in H. Accioly (éd.), Hommage d’une 
génération de juristes au Président Basdevant, (Pedone, Paris, 1960) pp.  258-262, and K. Wolfke, 
“Some Persistent Contoversies Regarding Customary International Law”, NYIL, vol. 24, 1993, p. 5.     
44 M. Virally, “Panorama du droit international contemporain”, RCADI, vol. 183, 1985, p. 182, and A.-
A. Cançado Trindade, “Contemporary International Law-Making: Customary International Law and 
the Systematization of the Practice of States”, Institute of Public International Law and International 
Relations of Thessaloniki, Thesaurus Acroasium, vol. 19, 1992, p. 78.  
45As Above 7, Koskenniemi, Apology to Utopia. pp. 388 et seq. and especially pp. 410 et seq..  
46 For a collection of essays, see, as above at 10, Kamminga et al., Impact of Human Rights Law. For a 
list of authors on the topic, as well as a critical appraisal of the theory, see V.P. Tzevelekos, “Revisiting 
the Humanisation of International Law: Limits and Potential. Obligations Erga Omnes, Hierarchy of 
Rules and the Principle of Due Diligence as the Basis for Further Humanisation”, Erasmus Law 
Review, vol. 6(1), 2013, pp. 62-76. 
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already demonstrated, define it too – these theories also acquire a normative 
dimension. In the present instance, the term normative implies both what the law 
ought to be, and what it is as a norm – the content and force of which is recognised by 
a court. Regarding the former dimension of the term normative in the present 
instance, any theory aspiring to provide an answer to the “existential” question of 
what endows a rule (especially a non-written one) with legal force cannot be but 
normative in the sense that (among other reasons), for rules to acquire the power of 
law, they ought to meet the requirements of the theory. Theories set the framework, 
and law cannot be law, unless it fits that framework. Finally, regarding the latter use 
of the term, when these theories are applied by courts and judges, because of the 
authority these actors have to identify the law, ought becomes is.  
 
To conclude, this argument posits that custom is influenced by the preferences of 
judges; they tend to rely on their personal perception of what law is and they 
accordingly project that perception to the definition of custom as a source/matrix. To 
give an example, what would have happened if Dionisio Anzilotti – one of the most 
eminent figures of international voluntarism – had not participated in the Lotus Court? 
Or, if Judge Nyhom had been in the place of the President of that Court (thanks to 
whose casting vote the decision passed, as the votes among the members of the Court 
where equally divided). Judge Nyhom had openly precluded in his dissenting opinion 
that custom could be the product of the individual will of states, linking it to 
international ethics and necessity. In his words,  
 
“the foundation of a custom must be the united will of several and even 
of many States constituting a union of wills, or a general consensus of 
opinion among the countries which have adopted the European system 
of civilization, or a manifestation of international legal ethics which 
takes place through the continual recurrence of events with an innate 
consciousness of their being necessary.”47 
 
3. Custom as a norm, and the role of judges and courts  
 																																																								
47 As above at 29, PCIJ, Lotus, dissenting opinion by M. Nyholm, 07-09-1927, Series A, No 10, p. 60.  
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Thus far, this paper has argued that judges and courts, while establishing the existence 
of (i.e. identifying) a customary rule, and through judicial interpretation, define what 
custom is as a source/matrix of international law intended to generate customary 
rules. What follows aims at discussing another dimension of the role of judicial 
function, this time not with regard to the definition of custom, but to its normative 
outputs, that is, the customary norms/rules. What (inter alia) distinguishes custom 
from the other big source of international law, namely treaties, is that the latter are 
formalised. Unlike treaties, where, for them to be valid, certain pre-agreed procedures 
and formal requirements need to be met, custom is in essence informal.48 This is why 
it is described as a process and not a procedure.49 That being said, the second 
argument defended in this paper is that, de facto, by recognising in their decisions the 
validity of customary rules they identify, courts and judges act as a substitute to the 
absence of formalism in international custom making. Consequently, they allow 
customary rules to obtain an objective content.         
      
No matter whether custom is binding because of the will of states, or because it 
reflects societal values translated in legal necessity, its pivotal characteristic remains 
in that the subjects (that is, in principle, states) that partake as members of the 
international society in the customary process do not share any formalised channels 
allowing them to compare their respective practice and qualify it as customary, or 
communicate in a systematic way their views, will, understanding etc. about the 
content and the existence (or not) of a customary rule. Put in different terms, although 
custom (unless if it is regional, or institutional) amounts to general international law,50 
that is, while it creates objective51 obligations binding all states, it relies on the 
																																																								
48 See for instance, as above at 3, Dupuy, “L’unité de l’ordre”, p. 160. D’Aspremont distinguishes 
between formal law-ascertainment and formal evidence of law. Custom is informal in both respects. As 
above at 26, J. d’Aspremont, Formalism and Sources, pp. 151-154, and pp. 162-170. 
49 As above at 44, Virally, “Panorama international contemporain”, p. 181.  
50 Contra Y. Onuma, “The ICJ: An Emperor Without Clothes? International Conflict Resolution, 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and the Sources of International Law, in N. Ando, E. McWhinney and R. 
Wolfrum (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (vol. 1, Kluwer, 2002) pp. 203 et seq..  
51 As opposed to treaties that only have an inter-subjective or relative effect that precludes them from 
creating obligations against non-signatory parties 
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subjective belief/conviction of each state regarding its existence and content.52 The 
contrast between the objective nature of the normative output and its subjective 
origins is sonorous. In the absence of an extraneous to the customary process agent, 
that is to say, a “third” actor, whose standpoint would differ from that of all other 
involved in the customary process actors, the normative output of that process can 
hardly be a unique, common to all conception of the customary rule. Consequently, 
because of the lack of formalism and the non-written nature of custom, rather than 
one, single, objective normative output, there are varied, subjective, and fragmented 
perceptions of it, corresponding to the respective understanding (or even interests) of 
each state or other involved actor.  
 
According to the argument defended in the paper, de facto, judges and courts cover 
that “gap”.53 Every time they have to come up with an answer to a dispute or a legal 
question, they are required to reach their outcome using the law (in the way they so 
interpret it). When that law is nebulous regarding its content or legal validity, as 
custom is, judicial function involves – apart from determining the concrete effect that 
should be given to the rule54 – a process of legal identification. Thereby, judges and 
courts exercise authority and recognise the existence and the content of a customary 
rule. By doing so, they recognise its legal validity too.55 This allows them to rely on it 
and apply it. That aspect of judicial reasoning, namely the law-recognising function of 																																																								
52 J. Kammerhofer, “Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International 
Law and Some of Its Problems”, EJIL, vol. 15, 2004, p. 553. According to the author, “[t]he law, like 
all ideas, remains intangible and empirically incognizable – a fiction. Like any ideal, law only exists 
because we choose to think it. This figment of our collective imagination would only become certain, if 
all humans thought about the same thing when they thought about “norms” or “law”. But this will not 
happen, not as long as our consciousness is individual consciousness.” 
53 The same could be said to a certain degree about any other agent having the authority to give custom 
a written form, such as the ILC that codifies international law, or the UNGA.    
54 See d’Aspremont, who distinguishes between content-determination, and law ascertainment in 
interpretation. J. d’Aspremont, “The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-
Determination and Law-Ascertainment Distinguished”, forthcoming in A. Bianchi, D. Peat and M. 
Windsor (eds.), Interpretation in International Law (OUP, 2015), available online at: 
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402758]. 
55 Cf. D. Lefkowitz, “The Sources of International Law: Some Philosophical Reflexions”, in S. Besson 
and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, (OUP, Oxford, 2010) pp. 199-201. 
According to the author, “ideally, a rule of recognition serves two functions. The first, ontological, 
function makes possible the kind of justification and criticism constitutive of a rule-governed practice 
for identifying norms as legally valid. The second, authoritative resolution, function makes possible the 
settling of disputes over the content and scope of particular legal norms. I maintain that customary 
international law rests on a rule of recognition that performs only the first of these two functions, one 
with the following content: N is a customary legal norm if most states regard it as a customary legal 
norm from what Hart calls the internal point of view, and what makes it a customary legal norm is that 
most states regard it as such” (pp. 199-200).    
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courts and judges, could be seen as a de facto substitute to the informal nature of 
custom and to the lack of certainty that this entails.56 This is relevant also to what Hart 
has described as the absence of a rule of recognition in the international legal order.57 
International courts, having the authority to juris dicere, which is what jurisdiction 
literally means, exercise that authority to formally recognise custom as valid, posited 
international law. Thereby, they allow custom to acquire one single, objective content, 
irrespective of the subjective understanding states may have of it. Besides, the Hartian 
rule of recognition is not a necessary precondition for the normative force of positive 
law.58 It is merely a luxury that can only be found in advanced socio-legal systems.59 
“In the simpler form of society”, as the international one is, “we must wait and see 
whether a rule gets accepted as a rule or not”60. The role of courts in that instance is to 
validate that acceptance. “When the courts use [customary rules], and make orders in 
accordance with them which are enforced, then for the first time these rules receive 
legal recognition”.61 
  
Would that imply that judges and courts are making the law?62 In principle, the 
answer to that question shall be in the negative.63 Defining judicial activism is a rather 
difficult task – one that clearly escapes the scope of this paper. Suffice it to maintain 
																																																								
56 Courts and judges exercise their law-recognising function every time there is doubt about the validity 
of a rule and the rights and obligations that may derive from it. This applies with regard to other than 
custom sources as well. See, for instance, ICJ, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Greece v. Turkey, 19-12-
1978, paras. 94-108, where the Court had to decide whether a joint communiqué of the parties to the 
dispute amounted to an international agreement.    
57 As above at 13, Hart, Concept of Law, p. 214 and, on the effect of recognition, pp. 94 et seq. and 
especially pp. 100 et seq.. But, as such, custom could be seen as a rule of recognition (above at 13). 
58 Ibid., p. 235, as well as p. 214. 
59 Ibid., p. 235.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. p. 46. 
62 As above at 24, J. d’Aspremont, Formalism and Sources, pp. 41-42. 
63 Cf. above at 4, Weil, “Le droit international”, p. 143. See also the idea of “creative judicial activity” 
(p. 126) based on the “constructive consideration [by judges] of the needs of the international society” 
(p. 124) defended by H. Lauterpacht in The Function of Law in the International Community, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933) pp. 123 et seq.. Fitzmaurice opposed the idea of judge-made custom, 
but recognised that “it is equally a truism that a constant process of development of the law goes on 
through the courts”. G. Fitzmaurice, “Judicial Innovation. It’s Uses and its Perils. As Exemplified in 
Some of the Work of the International Court of Justice during Lord McNair’s Period of Office”, in R.-
Y. Jennings (ed.), Essays in Honour of Lord McNair, (Stevens, London, 1965) p. 24. From his side, 
Meron criticises the “legislative character of the judicial process”, merging “is” with “ought”. T. 
Meron, “The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law”, AJIL, vol. 81, 1987, p. 361.         
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here that judges are only given the authority64 to recognise law – not to create it. 
Custom is elaborated within and by the society through rather informal pathways; 
then it is recognised as valid law.65 This is not acceptable in developed legal systems 
that contain centralised institutions, formalised law making channels and rules of 
recognition. However, it is fine for the less advanced, and highly decentralised order 
of international law whose systemic features make it necessary that courts recognise 
the validity of custom. Does that make judges and courts part of the customary 
process? The answer to that question is that this might not be as innocent a question 
as it prima facie looks. For, answering it entails suggesting whether the definition of 
custom, its fait créateur,66 shall encompass judicial recognition,67 and whether such 
recognition shall have a declarative or a constitutive effect. However, this would 
contradict that paper’s very aspiration to limit its analysis to observation, and abstain 
from making any claims that might comprise a normative dimension. Suffice it to 
suggest here that, even if courts and judges do not construct the content of the 
customary rule, they may impact on and allegedly (co-)construct the definition of 
custom as a source of law that generates customary rules. Thus, judges might affect 
the customary rule to the extent that the matrix (i.e. custom as a source of law) 
matters for it and its validity. 
 
4. Concluding remarks           
                   
The paper has employed the language and the tools – such as observation68 – of legal 
positivism 69  with a view to critically discuss custom as a source of positive 																																																								
64 In that respect see Combacau, who, rather than basing his analysis on the concept of authority, 
emphasises the aspect of competence/power of an organ/institution to posit the law or confirm its 
existence. J. Combacau, “Le droit international. Bric-à-brac ou système?” Archives de philosophie du 
droit, tome 31 (Le système juridique), Sirey, Paris, 1986, pp. 96-97.  
65 See for instance Lefkowitz who distinguishes between the formation process and the moment of the 
judgment made as to the legal validity of a customary rule. As above at 55, Lefkowitz, “The Sources of 
International Law”, pp. 201-203.  
66 R. Ago, “Droit positif et droit international”, AFDI, vol. 3, 1957, p. 21.  
67 See for instance H. Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit. Introduction à la science du droit, Thévenaz H. 
(translation), La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1953, p. 46; J. Charpentier, “Tendances de l’élaboration du 
droit international public coutumier”, L’élaboration du droit international public. Colloque de 
Toulouse, SFDI, Pedone, Paris, 1975, pp. 106-107 ; and P. Guggenheim, “Les deux éléments de la 
coutume en droit international”, Études en l’honneur de Georges Scelle, vol. 1, LGDJ, Paris, 1950, p. 
280.  
68 H. Batiffol, “L’apport d’un internationaliste à la notion de positivité du droit”, in P. Ziccardi (ed.), Le 
droit international à l’heure de sa codification: études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, (Giuffré, Milano, 
1987) p. 5; As above at 67, Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit, p. 43.  
69 For an overview, as above at 66, Ago, “Droit positif”, pp. 14-62.  
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international law. Positivism requires the law to be posited through formalised 
channels;70 allegedly, this guarantees neutrality. The argument suggested in the paper 
is that custom is indeed a social construct, that is, it is posited, although it is not 
constructed in a way that fully satisfies the exigencies of legal positivism, whereas its 
identification is definitely not as ideologically neutral as positivism pretends to be.  
 
There are some very obvious traits of custom that lend to its departure from the 
standards of legal positivism. Mainly, this is in essence informal; by no means does it 
favour legal certainty with regard to what is valid law, which, is one of the 
cornerstones of positivism. Nevertheless, it is not a coincidence that this particular 
means of law making is flourishing within the system of international law, which, to 
date, remains decentralised, reflecting the quasi-anarchic nature of its constitutive 
society. In such a legal environment, mainly in the absence of a central legislator, 
custom appears to be a necessary, albeit problematic, solution. It is necessary because 
it is the basis for general international law, that is, law binding all the members of that 
society. Without custom, there is no one single, common to all states legal system. On 
the other hand, it is problematic because it relies on a number of criteria, such as the 
so-called psychological element (opinio juris), that are difficult to be empirically 
observed and essentially lie outside the sphere of law. Lawyers will always have 
difficulties in explaining how facts (reality) transform into law. Furthermore, in the 
absence of an objective agent (such as a “super-state” or any sort of central legislator), 
custom is bound to be something “less” than objective law; it is destined to depend on 
the subjective understanding and conceptions states may have of it. Indeed, it is states 
that co-form, interpret and apply custom, and of course they do so based on their 
individual, subjective and, by definition, also fragmented and partial vision of a 
particular social reality, which they see as transformed into allegedly objective law. 
Instead of one objective customary rule, there are various conceptions of it and this 
applies with regard to both its normative force and its content.  
 
That very oxymoron, namely the subjective nature of a law proclaiming objectivity, is 
inherent to international law and its decentralised structure. This is why the paper 
pointed to the role of international judges and courts, who are conceived here as a de 																																																								
70 Regarding custom as a source of positive law see, as above at 12, Kelsen, “Théorie du droit 
international coutumier”, p. 64.    
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facto substitute to the absence of formalism and of agents having the power to 
identify and objectively recognise the validity of custom as law.  
 
As already mentioned, jurisdiction means juris dicere; this reflects Montesquieu’s 
idea of the function of the judiciary as “bouche de la loi”. Judges are expected to tell 
what the law is and not to create it. However, the line separating law making from 
interpretation may be proven to be fine. This is the case of the innately informal 
international custom. Judges are given the authority to formally recognise the 
existence (i.e. legal validity) of a customary rule. In doing so, the paper argues, they 
are covering the absence in international law of the Hartian rule of recognition. This is 
what makes them a substitute to the deficiencies of the international legal system. In 
the absence of a rule of recognition, we resort to agents, such as international courts, 
which have the authority to juris dicere. 
 
The other main argument suggested in the paper relates to the power of judges and 
courts to define custom.  As such, the definition of custom as a source of international 
law is a rule. By identifying customary rules (i.e. the normative product of the 
customary process, that is, a custom-rule) judges also (re-)define custom as a “matrix” 
(i.e. the process leading to the customary rule, that is, custom-source). Thereby, they 
may be also proven to be influencing the content of the normative output of that 
source, namely the customary rule. This is where (positivist) observation is of 
importance. The brief overview of the definition of custom before primarily the ICJ 
attempted to demonstrate that judicial definition of custom as a matrix vacillates 
between two ideological (and, therefore, highly political too) extremes: voluntarism, 
which corresponds to a theory of international legal positivism that identifies state 
will as the basis for the normative force of international law, and its adversary (but 
equally positivist) theory, sociological objectivism, which explains the force of law on 
the basis of social necessity instead of the sovereign will of the state, which, in that 
case, is expected to decline, giving space to what is seen (also by judges) as necessary 
in and for the society.  
 
The first set of conclusions to be reached is that, without judicial confirmation of the 
existence of the customary rule, there is no legal certainty, whereas the very existence 
of the rule might ultimately depend on the definition of custom judges and courts 
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give. Be it custom a social construct, that is, a product of the international community 
(of states71), its fate is concomitant with the judicial function. For, it is courts and 
judges (or other agents having the authority to tell what the law is, such as the ILC) 
who formally recognise the legal validity of the customary process, but also interpret 
its matrix, thereby defining what custom is. Yet, neither judges, nor their definition of 
the customary matrix are neutral – as legal positivism claims custom to be. Indeed, it 
could be argued – admittedly, not without a touch of provocation – that positivism is 
not as hostile to the subjective spirit of post-modernism as one would think.  
 
The second set of conclusions refers to the idea of the power of legality found on the 
basis of this collective volume. The paper attempted to show that, indeed, there is 
space for legality beyond the formalistic constraints of positivism, which appears in 
its very basis to be far from immune to ideological preferences and, more generally, 
to extra-legal assumptions and aspirations. Recently, the ILC added international 
custom to its agenda.72 Its work is expected to contribute to the building of a more 
concrete and solid understanding of custom, its identification and definition –
restricting, thereby, the margin of discretion judges and courts enjoy in that respect. 
However, custom will remain as informal in its nature as it has always been. Legality 
– especially where formalism is absent – is constructed by the practice of 
interpretative communities. Thus, the paper confirms the first heuristic suggested by 
the book editors. Judges, the ILC, but also the International Law Association, the 
Institut de droit international and, more generally, scholarship, including this paper, 
are interpreting custom – and the interpretation of it other interpreters made. The only 
difference being that, within the system of international law, formally speaking, not 
all of these interpretive actors exercise the same degree of authority. Thus, to 
paraphrase the well-known saying from the Animal Farm, within this community of 
interpreters, all interpreters are equal in the contribution their practice makes to 
custom making, but some are more equal than others.  
																																																								
71 Cf., for instance, C. Ochoa “The Individual and Customary International Law Formation”, VJIL, vol. 
48, 2007-2008, pp. 119-186.  
72 ILC, A/CN.4/663, First report on formation and evidence of customary international law, by Sir 
Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, Sixty-fifth session, 2013, and A/CN.4/672, Second report on 
identification of customary international law, by Sir Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, Sixty-sixth 
session, 2014. 
